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Privatizing Pension  
Systems as the End  
of a Vicious Taboo  




At the beginning of the 80’s one South American dictator had discovered eco-
nomic freedom, while Europe’s democracies were refining the Bismarckian objec-
tive of intergeneration dependency. Enlightened by the economist José Piñera, an 
unknown figure at the time, he had realized that pensions were supposed to be 
responsible savings and not a discretionary right against society. Augusto Pino-
chet would terminate the public pension system in Chile and he would also de-
termine the governments of the “free world” to enter serious debates. Today, more 
and more reports warn that Europe’s population is ageing and shrinking. The 
sustainability of public pension systems is becoming more vulnerable by the year. 
The EU already sees dark clouds approaching public finance. The solutions cir-
culated – e.g. facilitating immigration in order to restore the balance of the labour 
market or parametric reform of the existing pension systems – do not tackle, 
though, with programmatic errors of such a mechanism in which, invariably, the 
guilty are always the people that do not grow old by bureaucrats calculus.  
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Being invited by mid September in Bucharest to the “European Re-
source Bank Meeting”, an event organized by the Institutional Analy-
sis  and  Development  Center  (CADI  Eleutheria),  dedicated  to  the 
European pro-liberal intellectual community and not only to it, José The Romanian Economic Journal 
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Piñera made a remarkable speech about the practical part of the pen-
sions reform in recovering the meanings of the modern society. Piñera 
is currently, literally, a true hero in Latin America. By analyzing his re-
formist creation in Chile, which besides the privatization of the public 
pension system includes a liberal labour law and the mines privatiza-
tion too, we could discover in this Chilean economist a perfectly in-
verted Che Guevara. José  Piñera preached the “workers’ freedom and 
empowerment”
1,  and  not  under  the  form  of  the  Marxist  jargon, 
through expropriation and equalization, but allowing the free access to 
hold  private  capital  (and)  by  means  of  a  private  pension  system, 
planned to finance and not to wear out the nation’s process of capital-
ist accrual. 
 
Limits of the rationality of the Welfare State
2 
 
As an artisan of the Chilean reform of the pension system, José Piñera 
was Labour Minister within Pinochet government. When holding this 
office, at the beginning of the ’80s, Piñera began to put into practice 
his plan, a plan of delivering the national pension system in his coun-
try, but also of using this means and other related ones for growing 
the entire economy. The initial reasoning, which was subsequently re-
sumed in all the pleadings made by the Chilean economist during the 
last quarter of the century to the world’s politicians and to all people 
intrigued by the magic of the Chilean private pension system, still re-
mains of an overwhelming common sense.  
It is all begun in the 19
th century Germany, where the chancellor of 
the second Reich, Otto von Bismarck, laid the foundations of the in-
spirational source for the pattern of the welfare modern State. The 
thesis about the “Welfare State” was for a long time presented as a 
                     
1 Piñera, José (1996, 2001). 
2 A term closer to truth is that of “welfare State”, as the welfare production was more of a re-
distribution process as one of net creation. These proved to not be sustainable in time, due to 
the perverse effects of the increased taxation and the excess of regulations of the society’s ca-
pacity to accrue capital (the healthy solution for the economic growth).  The Romanian Economic Journal 
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model less restrictive than the socialism, from the point of view of the 
individual freedom, and also less unfair, comparing to the greedy capi-
talism. In other words, a “third way”, a “middle way”, different from 
the pure patterns of the capitalism and the socialism and twice moral. 
One of the great lawyers of freedom, Friedrich von Hayek, tried in his 
writing, The Constitution of Liberty, to distinguish between the socialism 
and  the  “Welfare  State”.  The  famous  economist  assessed  that  the 
“Welfare State” would replace a declining socialism and would offer in 
the same time, as regards sufficient aspects, a social arrangement com-
patible  with  the  idea  of  liberty.  However,  the  condescendence  of 
Hayek towards the “Welfare State” was somehow inconvenient. The 
irony, the “Welfare State” was never thought qua an independent sys-
tem, but as a method to gradually transform a market economy into 
socialism!
 1  
Among the instruments of the Bismarckian Welfare-State, as a central 
point, it was the precursor of the present pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems. There are three absurdities that define it: 1) the ignorance of the 
capitalization idea, 2) the elimination of the contributions - benefits 
link, 3) its replacement with the expensive and arbitrary principle of 
the  intergeneration  transfers.  The  socialization  of  the  pension  sys-
tems
2, even insular as it is currently within the relatively free contem-
                     
1 See Mises, Ludwig von, Economic Freedom and Interventionism, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: 
Foundation for Economic Education, 1990. This detail is clearly suggested by the original ac-
tion plan of the Socialists – the Communist Manifest in 1848 drafted by Karl Marx – which 
presents a series of Government measures necessary to gradually implement the socialism. The 
most important ones were also mentioned by the Manifest and their mere reading reveals these 
were not but the same measures that formed later the core of the activity of what was mainly 
known as the “welfare State”, of what was concretely found in the vision of the Chancellor 
Bismark and of the Emperor Wilhelm related to the so-called German Sozialpolitik, and also in 
the American New Deal or the effort of the British socialism of Fabian type. The Manifest ac-
knowledges that the suggested measures are “economically insufficient economic and not sus-
tainable”, but points out the fact that during the evolutions to which these are associated, they 
will be expanded and detailed, requiring some additional interventions into the old order, being 
irreplaceable as means necessary to entirely revolutionize the former production method. The 
sincerity of the proponents of such action plan is disarming: everything that would characterize 
the welfare State was not thought but as a stop on the road to socialism. 
2 Mises, Ludwig von (1950). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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porary economies, encounters some fundamental issues: in addition to 
the fact that it is about adverse incentives, interests groups, opportun-
ist alliances business-government, a parasitic dynamics of the interven-
tion – and the public pension systems  represent an intervention form 
through public control of certain resources –, it leads to the State’s ex-
tension, to the socialization of an increasing part of the economy in 
order to cover the structural deficits. And the ‘socialisms’ (based on 
State’s ownership and control over the resources) face the undefeatable 
issue of the “economic estimation”
1 which sentences them to arbitra-
tion. This is applicable also for the interventionism islands. The State 
not only has any “profit motivation” constraint in order to maximize 
its activity – it never goes bankrupt! – but, by every of its interven-
tions, the State automatically undermines itself any estimation instru-
ment, in fact the prices, and thus the society is invariably directed to-
wards the capital expenditure and poverty. On the contrary, a private 
pension system (even partially) has an honest effect for the economy: 
having interests qua investors, the workers will have a correct attitude 
towards the capital market. They will no longer ask for ‘social’ policies 
directed against the capital, as a weak stock exchange means a poor 
pension. Instead of envy, respect for the ownership and the free mar-
ket. 
                     
1 In 1920, Mises proved it his remarkable article entitled “Economic Calculation in the Social-
ist Society” that, due to the economy complexity, the centralized planning cannot make the pro-
duction more efficient within the society than it makes the labour division in a market econ-
omy. This is because the socialism cannot address a rational allocation of the resources. The 
consideration of the Austrian economist could be summarized as follows: in absence of the  
private property over the production factors, the market of production factors is missing (vol-
untary exchanges among the owners at negotiated prices); once the markets of such categories 
of goods disappear (or cannot appear) prices of the production factors; the absence of such 
prices makes impossible to calculate the costs (under monetary terms) and therefore the profits. 
Consequently it results the irrationality of any investment decision within such regime  The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
225 
Economy of the European Demographic Decline 
 
Many analysts content themselves to affirm that the decrepitude of the 
public pension systems in the European Union countries would be an 
exclusive demographic issue. Kind of “the dead is guilty”, but formu-
lated in a sophisticated manner. The demographic regress is unques-
tionable, but its occurrence is related exactly to the social and eco-
nomic architecture of that part of Europe where the pension systems 
flirt with the collapse. According to the estimations mentioned in the 
“Green Card regarding the demographical changes”, published by the 
European Commission in January 2005, the increase of the life expec-
tancy (a positive thing) correlated to the decrease of the fertility rate (a 
negative thing) would result in the reduction of the population able to 
work in the European Union until 2030 by 20.8 million people, e.g. by 
6.8%. It is estimated that in 2030 there will be, on an average, two ac-
tive persons (being 15 to 65 years old) for one inactive person (being 
more than 65 years old) and 18 million children and young people less 
than today. 
If “the positive thing” is due to the development of the medical sci-
ences, “the negative thing” is in no way related to a biological evolu-
tion of the mankind (the medicine and its solutions for the extension 
of life or to contraception), as it is not related to any “stress” of the 
(post)industrial age. The reduction of birth rate may be imputed rather 
to the aggravation of the socialization policies of the natural functions 
of the family – mainly the upbringing and the education of children or 
the looking after the old parents.
1 The hostile demographic trends are 
not the cause, but only the revelator of the project error. 
The omnipresence of the ‘State’ assistance, in our case for old age, re-
sulted in the transformation of children into real burdens – they have 
to go to school and supported according to the exigencies – without 
any direct benefit for the parent, not even at old age.  Thus, it is not 
                     
1 Carlson (2003). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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necessary to have kids to support you, because you have a pension, 
don’t you? This would be one of the sources of the reduced birth rate: 
the privatization of the costs related to the upbringing and the education of a kid, 
as the benefits this one brings to his parents, at old age, are socialized. In the 
long run, the diversification of the aids, for different social situations, 
to the detriment of encouraging charity, have stimulated the increase 
of the number of children especially of the unproductive categories (as 
for example, the Maghreb families, having a large number of children, 
in the West, oversized based on the principle “more children, more 
money  from  allowances”).  The  responsible  and  productive  people, 
who are tax payers, are frequently limiting to just one successor. (This 
is also a reason for the unbalances and the source of the European 
paradox: high unemployment rate, but also an important risk of labour 
while, force penury.) 
 
Latino Offend at Welfare State standard 
 
For a people believed in the ‘natural’ impossibility of Latin America to 
offer a sustainable pattern for civilization.
1 The continent, freed of its 
‘founding generals’ – Bolivar, O’Higgins, San Martin or Sucre – has 
forgotten at the end the freedom itself, the law supremacy and the 
democracy that the ‘founding members’ of the United States – and 
partially their successors – put into practice in the North. Latin Amer-
ica is the prisoner of the idea according to which the democracy has to 
be the freedom protector, and not vice versa. The reforms change 
with the times, and the times change with the chimera. The diluted 
constitutionalism, specific to the region, blocked the extension just of 
those institutions proper for the legitimate construction of the pros-
perity. The safeguard of the right to live, to liberty, and to ownership 
remains event today uneven and seasonal in South America.  
The Chilean revolution in the ‘70s is one of the most controversial po-
litical movements of the contemporary history. Augusto Pinochet has 
                     
1 Piñera (2003). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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combined in its philosophy the violent oppression of the Marxist left 
with the positive construction of an economic liberal order. Under 
such mix circumstances, one of the greatest taboos of the modern 
times was attacked in Chile: the ‘binding’ of the third age to the Wel-
fare State. Though the privatization of the pension system à la Chile is 
not a “puritan” market solution, but a public-private compromise, it is 
perhaps the most audacious measure ever taken for eliminating the 
macro-unbalances of the imprisonment within the public pension sys-
tem. Despite the computations of the economy’s pattern makers, this 
is impossible to be ‘parametrically’ repaired. The people, who do not 
age as stipulated by the bureaucratic equations, often remain guilty 
within this system. 
The three main features of the Chilean pattern
1 for the pension priva-
tization upon its inauguration in 1981 were as follows: 1) the Gov-
ernment guaranteed the existing pensioners that their benefits would 
not be affected by the reform, 2) the workers eligible for the private 
pension schemes had the possibility to chose, or not, to continue con-
tributing to the public system and 3) the newly entered on the labour 
market were made available only the mandatory private pensions.  
In brief, the pattern. To the fixed private contribution, i.e. 10% of the 
gross salary, certain optional contribution may be added up to 10%, 
which are deductible. The money is invested to the pension funds tax 
free, and will be charged only upon its withdrawal at the retirement 
moment. The accrued amounts may be used at the retirement moment 
either to acquire a family annuity from a private insurance company, 
or be withdrawn by monthly fractions, or as a combination between 
these two. Should the accrued amounts in the private accounts, for at 
least 20 years, cannot cover the minimum pension defined by law, the 
pensioners receive the minimum pension after the private amounts are 
spent.  
                     
1 Piñera  (2004a, 1998) The Romanian Economic Journal 
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The  Chileans  may  freely  choose  from  the  pension  funds  that  are 
strictly monitored by the Government. The diversity of bonds into 
which the funds are invested is encouraging, as there is no obligation 
to invest in government bonds. The sole requirement is that old work-
ers have their funds concentrated into short term instruments, with 
fixed income, but the young may invest their funds into shares. Those 
who accumulated enough for acquire annuities ‘enough’ – as defined 
by law (simultaneously, 50% of their average revenue and 20% over 
the minimum legal pension) – may start withdrawing from their pri-
vate accounts; there is no legal age for retirement, but only the obliga-
tion not to leave the pension system until the “enough” accrual is 
reached. 
The Chilean pattern has many partisans in Latin America. Mexico, Bo-
livia and El Salvador moved to fairly similar systems, Peru introduced 
the option ‘public or private’ for the employees existent at the reform 
moment,  but  not  the  obligation  for  the  newcomers  on  the  labour 
market to accede exclusively the private system, while Argentina, Co-
lumbia  and  Uruguay  chose  combined  systems,  partially  privatized, 
structured by ‘pillars’. Towards the end of the 90’s, Hungary, Poland 
and  Kazakhstan  decided  also  to  introduce  individual  pension  ac-
counts. Also the State-dependent country, Sweden, passed in 2001 a 
law whereby the workers were free to invest 2.5 pp out of the 18.5% 
paid  as  social  contributions  into  a  private  pension  account.  Even 
President Bush stated that America would require a refreshment of the 
pension system following the Chilean pattern, as, according to some 
opinions in 2018, and to others opinion in 2052, the American pen-
sion system might enter by law in suspension of payments (because 
‘de facto’ there are always fraudulent solutions at the Governments’ 
hand). Europe has still a greater exposure to collapse. Piñera has been 
mentioning for a long time the two Europes: one with “funded”, solv-
able pension systems, consisting in States with a significant private 
pension sector (UK, the Netherlands), States that have introduced for 
some time now the individual pension schemes (Sweden, Poland) and, The Romanian Economic Journal 
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respectively, States capable to finance the public systems out of their 
own general sound fiscal revenues (Ireland, Luxemburg). The remain-
ing part is “unfunded Europe”. Though hidden by the standard arith-
metic  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  their  risk  for  the  Euro  is 
enormous. 
But there are voices that have recently said that the Chilean pattern 
proved its limits, that the pensions are nor quite “fair”, the one cannot 
accumulate ‘enough’, according to law, that there is no satisfactory ne-
gotiation power of the tax payers as regards the private pension funds 
which obtain huge profits by granting small pensions to the pension-
ers, that the burden of the State that has to correct the ‘deficiencies’ is 
still heavy and that, ergo, the State should arrange everything. An ex-
planation is that with a labour market which looks like the Chilean 
one, such pension system cannot work. The young should begin early 
to pay-in the contributions so that they reach the ‘enough’ threshold, 
but this is often impossible for them as either the labour market is not 
so  giving,  or  they  cannot  deposit  more  than  the  legal  minimum 
amount, or they are not compelled to contribute at all in case the are 
not employed, but self-employed contractors. Yes, the Chilean pattern 
would not be hence fundamentally incorrect, but only fundamentally 
deficient. It is necessary to have an operational labour market, a com-
petition between the pension funds, not an oligopoly resulted from 
the ‘vigilant’ lay-offs and not the public intervention remnants and 
special rights inventories. Being denigrated due to populist reasons, 
the system may regress at any moment and convert  into a public and 
inefficient one.  
 
European and American Public Finances – Practical Lessons for 
Pensioners  
 
The demographical decline was badly administered, better to say it was 
aggravated in Europe, through public pension and social securities sys-
tems defined, on one hand, by onerous social contributions – for the 
tax payers –, and, on the other hand, through assistance and generous The Romanian Economic Journal 
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pensions, the latter ones granted at legal retirement ages that have 
been prematurely settled – for the tax consumers. Besides the incen-
tives that are adverse to labour element, the existence of a legislation 
that increase the employment costs leads to unemployment and stiffen 
furthermore  the  labour  market.  The  entire  bureaucratic  and  fiscal 
brake aggravates the social trend to limit the demographical regenera-
tion, completing the vicious circle of the “European social pattern”. 
The economic consequences of this definite situation are among the 
most perverse ones. According to an analysis conducted by the Euro-
pean Commission, published prior to the enlargement in 2004
1, eight 
of  the  former  European  Union  member  States  (Austria,  Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) may be deemed, 
as regards the public finances sustainability, as “marked”. The main 
reason is: the continuous accumulation of unfunded liabilities within 
the public pension systems. These have been partially disclosed by se-
rious budgetary deficits  in  Europe  during  the  last  years  (Germany, 
France, etc.). 
José Piñera, President of the International Center for Pension Reform, draws 
the attention in an article entitled “Will the Pension Time Bomb Sink 
the Euro?”
2 to a separation between the European Union States pur-
suant to the principle of pension systems “solvability”. On one hand, 
there would be the “funded Europe” consisting in States having a sig-
nificant private pension sector (UK, the Netherlands), States that have 
begun to implement individual pension schemes (Sweden, Poland), as 
well as States having solid public finances, capable to finance the pub-
lic pension systems with the help of the general revenues obtained 
from taxes and fees (Ireland, Luxemburg). The remaining part is the 
                     
1 The European Commission recently stated, “There is a risk of unsustainable public finances in 
some half of EU countries. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Por-
tugal are on this black list.” Furthermore, the monetary affairs commissioner of the European 
Union warned, “There is only a limited window of opportunity for countries to get their public 
finances  in  order  before  the  budgetary  impact  of  aging  takes  hold  as  of  2010”  (EUob-
server.com, May 21, 2003). 
2 Piñera (2004b) The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
231 
“unfunded Europe”. The major fear would be that the countries hav-
ing the most severe unbalances between generations, thus having “un-
funded” pension systems, might be tempted to lobby the European 
Central Bank (ECB) for obtaining a “cheaper” Euro in order to hide 
the deficits, which could lead to the increase of the inflation in Euro-
land.  And  the  potential  “surrender”  of  the  ECB  might  result  in  a 
strong reaction of the States with a tradition of strictly limited infla-
tion, and even in the decomposition of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
 
“The bottom line is that generational imbalances across the eurozone 
gravely threaten the single currency’s medium term viability [111]. . . . 
[C]ountries with the most severe generational imbalances may exert 
pressure  on  the  ECB  to  loosen  monetary  policy.  For  most  of  the 
twentieth century, after all, printing money was often the line of least 
resistance for governments having fiscal difficulties [117]. . . . History 
therefore suggests that asymmetric fiscal problems—often generated 
by war—quickly cause monetary unions between fiscally independent 
states to dissolve. The fiscal problems caused by bloated social security 
and pension systems could have a similar centrifugal effect on EMU, 
with welfare substituting for war as the fatal solvent [120].
1 [Ferguson, 
N., and Kotlikoff, L. (2000)] 
Currently the vision divergences can explain satisfactorily at least the 
reticence of some State in the first category (UK, Denmark and Swe-
den) to enter the “eurozone” exposed to a potential inflationist risk. 
The most mistrustful element, as regards the issues and, symmetrically, 
the reforms of the public pension systems, is the lack of correlation 
between the amounts paid by the employee during its active life as 
contribution, and the amounts it receives upon retirement. The supply 
of the obtainable pensions does not take place through the capitaliza-
                     
1 Ferguson and Kotlikoff (2000). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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tion of the amounts deposited, but through transfers between genera-
tions, which makes the system vulnerable towards the adverse demo-
graphical evolutions. The idea of a simple parametric reform of the 
public  pension  systems  would  mean  to  keep  the  current  operating 
principle of the public pensions and only to try to somehow repair the 
lack of correlation between the inputs and the outputs by amending 
only the features of legal retirement age, benefices or social contributions. The 
Chilean economist José Piñera finds first of all three reasons due to 
which such reform would not succeed. 
First of all, the viability of such measure would be asymmetric among the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union States, which means that the intra-community tensions 
would be somewhat maintained. While in certain States that are character-
ized for example by the organic labour cult, the raise of the legal re-
tirement age would be implemented without any social conflict (Ger-
many,  for  example),  in  other  States  even  the  marginal  adjustments 
have been received with hostility (France, for instance).  
Secondly, a substantial raise of the legal retirement age could lead to behavioral 
mutations of the employees forced to extend their active life. For example, the 
States having a better social protection and extensive programs des-
tined to disabled people, it could happen that the Government expen-
diture reserve for pensions be transferred to other social aid programs 
if the employee is tempted and has also the possibility to obtain such a 
treatment. Moreover, most of the European States having rigid labour 
legislations  maintain  an  unemployment  level  quite  elevated.  This 
means that it will be difficult for an old person to keep its job, but also 
to find a new job, because the salaries cannot be adjusted by the em-
ployer according to the decrease of the employee’s productivity as it’s 
getting older, due to the existence of certain “high” minimum legal 
salaries. 
Finally, it is invoked the fact that either the raise of the legal retirement age or the 
limitation of the benefits or the increase of the social contributions cannot but bring 
about a decrease of such contributions outputs that are already low. The reaction The Romanian Economic Journal 
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of the tax payer to leave the system or even the country could worsen 
the unbalance. 
Another circulated theory is that which sustains the facilitation of the 
legal immigration in order to complete the relative labour force deficit 
on the European continent, this issue being included in the European 
institutions agenda for some time. As the philosophy of the pension 
and social securities systems does not change, the arrival of the immi-
grants does not bring in any way something that is necessary better. 
Economically speaking, more cheap labour force will increase the un-
employment; reduce the salaries, therefore the volume of the social 
contributions accrued. Then, the immigrants will enter themselves into 
the system and will wish to enjoy their pensions. Because the system 
functions following the same old principles, the result would be only a 
postponement of the problems, and not their settlement. And not fi-
nally there could be issues related to the integration of the immigrants 
within the community due to the ethnic or religion differences. 
To facilitate an adjustment as natural as possible through the liberali-
zation of the workers fluxes is a constructive action, but this is not the 
solution to the issue raised. The complete alternative would be the im-
plementation of certain personal pension plans, which might restore 
also the natural bond between the efforts undertaken and the results 
obtained, faulted by the costly and arbitrary principle of the transfers 
between the generations. Also there would be used instead of the pen-
sion systems based on fixed benefices, a more logically to conceive sys-
tem based on fixed contributions. 
Also, the opportunity calculations have showed that to go from the 
State pensions to the private pensions would be cheaper than to con-
tinuously adjust the premiums. Moreover, it is not impossible to imag-
ine a transition scenario which is not prejudicing the generations with 
which it intersects more than the status quo. The considerations in fa-
vor of the pensions privatization do not stop here. The data on long 
term shows in several countries that the outputs of the bonds on the The Romanian Economic Journal 
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market in which the liquidities of the private pension funds would be 
invested, are satisfactorily high in order to obtain an honorable gain, 
anyway superior to that obtained through the public systems. Also, the 
flexibility of the labour market would be restored by the correlation of 
the contributions with the benefices, eliminating the incentives for the 
old persons for they prematurely quit their jobs. 
In the USA
1 also it is deemed that, should things go as they do today, 
no later than in 2018 the social securities system will need a restora-
tive. In economics terms, this means that the financing of an increas-
ing part of the allocations owed to the pensioners will have to be made 
out of sources that are external to the system, as the amounts entered 
into the system under the form of social contributions will be below 
those that the American State undertook to pay. On the other hand, 
the optimistic over the ocean think that the troubles will occur much 
later, by the 40’s-50’s of this century.  
Between the pessimistic and the optimistic time horizon, the system 
would have to “consume” quietly the huge amounts under govern-
ment bonds, accrued during the years when the social securities col-
lected more than the pensioners have paid.  
However, fatality! At a closer look, such a finding does not change at 
all the situation. The government bonds held by the social securities 
system are not actively present, but these are receivables over the fed-
eral government based on which this one has the obligation to pay at 
the maturity date the amounts it does not hold physically and that it 
cannot obtain but 1) increasing the fees, 2) contracting loans from the 
population or 3)  “slightly” increasing  the money  supply. Thus,  the 
analysts believe, following the good tradition of this system’s function-
ing for more than 70 years, that the American State will increase, until 
the balance moment in 2018, once or several times the level of the so-
cial contributions and will obtain thus the wished funds.  
                     
1 Horowitz (2004). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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“Unfortunately, implementing the President's proposal entails trillions 
of additional dollars of government borrowing or new taxes in the 
years before any reduced need for Social Security taxes can materialize, 
because the funds being invested in the so-called private accounts will 
largely be at the expense of funds available to meet the system's pen-
sion obligations. Under the President's current proposal, as much as 
almost a third of the contributions made by the eligible workers and 
their employers  could  be  funneled  into  the  stock  market  and  thus 
would not be available to pay current pensions. Since the government 
is still obligated to pay those pensions, this shortfall can be covered 
only by additional borrowing, new taxes, or inflation of the money 
supply [...]  
Another, and potentially more serious, problem is that implementing 
the President's proposal would almost certainly mean a major increase 
in the government's power over business. Unless the government were 
prepared to give full freedom to the individual to invest in any stocks 
of his choice, it would, as a minimum, have to draw up a list of stocks 
that it approved for purchase. The result of this would be that a very 
large number of publicly traded companies would be under pressure 
to convince the government to add their stock to the list and to keep it 
on the list. In order to do this, of course, a company, and all the indi-
viduals prominently associated with it, would have to avoid doing any-
thing that might displease government officials and thereby lead the 
government to shun the company's stock. Thus a major new avenue 
of  arbitrary  government  power  would  be  opened  up.”
  1  [Reisman 
(2005)] 
 
Conclusions: Private Pension – About capital and Morality  
 
Lesson number one: the public system of social securities is not self-
sustaining. It is made sustainable, due to some economic operations 
that do not lack of evil consequences – both the increase of the taxa-
                     
1 Reisman (2005). The Romanian Economic Journal 
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tion and the inflation, have, besides the redistribution effect, and a re-
gress of capital effect. 
The daring solution suggested by Piñera remains however only a po-
litical compromise. As the economic measures exterior to the private 
pension system become more incomplete, the pensions systems seems 
more ‘inadequate’ to the reality.  
Then the structure based on the pillars does not settle anything for the 
long run, unless it is conceived as a transition towards the complete 
removal of the ill leg, the political system. Its infinite preservation may 
only reduce the current issues (even though not necessarily, being able 
to aggravate the unbalances on average term) and may keep perpetu-
ally the reasons for the ‘corrective’ welfare transfers.  
There is also the risk of the State deliberate intrusion into the business 
world. If the Government says in which share or bond is ‘prudent’ or 
not to invest the money of the pensioners, a competition may occur 
on the market for the politicians favors, led by the managers of the 
large companies, and which may come against the shareholders, and 
that if the titles in the company in which they are co-owners, reach 
certain freedom degrees on the controlled markets. 
The privatization of the pensions remains an action more responsible 
as  the  private  allocation  percentage  is  higher.  The  Romanian  have 
chosen for the beginning a responsibility of 2pp, also maybe because 
the cash-flow costs of the budgetary transaction were not prepared in 
due time, as in Chile
1. The stake is though essential: to transform the 
                     
1 There was no "economic" transition cost, because there is no harm to the gross domestic 
product from this reform (on the contrary, there is a huge benefit). A completely different issue 
is how to confront the "cash flow" transition cost to the government of recognizing, and ulti-
mately eliminating, the unfinanced Social Security liability. The implicit debt of the Chilean 
system in 1980 was about 80 percent of the G.D.P. 
We used five "sources" to generate that cash flow: a) one-time long-term government bonds at 
market rates of interest so the cost was shared with future generations; b) a temporary residual 
payroll tax; c) privatization of state-owned companies, which increased efficiency, prevented 
corruption and spread ownership; d) a budget surplus deliberately created before the reform 
(for many years afterward, we were able to use the need to "finance the transition" as a power-
ful argument to contain increases in government spending); e) increased tax revenues that re-The Romanian Economic Journal 
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